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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines the performance of four major
appropriations categories within the Department of Defense
budget for the period FY55-FY84. By performing descriptive
data analysis on budgeted outlays for the period under
study, it was determined that the availability of funds in
DOD affect different kinds of appropriations differently.
Analysis of the data was based on each category's budget
shares, growth rates, and percentages of the annual DOD
increment. Executive budget outcomes appeared to include
non-incremental adjustments and that these adjustments
are primarily in procurement and research, development,
test and evaluation categories. The category with the
most consistent success in competing for funds has been
research, development, test, and evaluation and a strong
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I. INTRODUCTION
Scrutiny of the Federal budget continues to increase as
budget deficits reach staggering levels. Public awareness
of the Federal budget emphasizes the well publicized
Department of Defense request and public pressure to reduce
defense spending is growing. The current Administration's
plans for the largest peacetime military buildup in U.S.
history is meeting growing opposition from Congress and the
public. Pressure is increasing to shift Federal emphasis
toward solving non-defense problems, such as welfare,
unemployment, and revitalization of the education system.
Detailed examination of the Federal budget is not new
and neither is the emphasis on the defense budget. Con-
sequently there has been a considerable am.ount of research
done on the subject of budgeting behavior in attem.pts to
describe the way in which budget figures are reached [Ref.l]
There is a body of literature which proposes that Congress-
ional budget action on non-defense and defense related
areas of the budget is conducted in an across-the-board,
incremental manner [Refs.2, 3, 4 and 5].
In this approach Congress is more interested in how much
is spent than in how it is spent. An opposing body of re-
search argues that budgeting activity is non-incremental and
that an agency's final appropriation is determined more by

Congressional desire to control how funds are spent than
by how much is spent [Refs. 6, 1 , 8 and 9]
.
This thesis perforins descriptive data analysis on
defense budget data for the last 30 years in order to dis-
cover if there are different patterns of distribution
across appropriations types under different conditions of
availability of funds. In addition, the study will attempt
to discover evidence of either increm.ental or non-incremental
budget activity. Where previous studies [Refs. 2, 3, 5 and
6] have dealt with Congressional action with regard to
appropriations, this study shall examine Presidential/OMB




The literature concerning governmental budgetary behav-
ior can be divided into two general groups [Ref . 1] . The
first is the incrementalist theory, which proposes that
budgetary action consists of making incremental changes
based primarily on the agency's current request and approp-
riation for the prior year [Ref. 2] . The second group is
that of non- incremental budget behavior: that budget
changes are more complex than the incremental theory
would suggest and that factors other than prior year approp-
riations play m.ajor or dominant roles [Ref. 6] .
The incremental theory consists of three major points.
First, agency budgets constitute starting levels from which
incremental changes occur. Second, these base levels
determine subsequent allocations. Third, changes to base
levels will be incremental in nature. [Ref. 7, p. 49] This
theory was presented by Davis, Dempster, and Wildavsky
[Ref. 2] , who Dropose that:
"...the behavior of the budgetary process of the
United States government results in aggregate decisions
similar to those produced by a set of simple decision
rules that are linear and temoorally stable." [Ref. 2:
p. 529]
The theory proposes that the current federal budget is
so complex that decision makers are incapable of dealing

with the budget as a whole and so use aids to calculation,
which make their calculations predictable. Davis et al.
present eight linear equations which reduce budget decisions
to simple, experimentally derived and tested mathematical
models. These equations, which represent Congressional
decision making, are based primarily on the agency's prior
year appropriation and its current request plus a random
disturbance variable.
The evidence presented by Davis, Dempster, and Wildavsky
for fifty-six non-defense agencies shows that their equations
describe past budget actions very accurately, however, they
stress that the equations are not good predictive models due
to the fact that the process is stable only for short per-
iods. Without a method of determining shift points within
the model any predictions produced by the model must be
highly suspect [Ref. 2, p. 542].
The incrementalist model proposed by Fenno uses annual
percent change of the agency's appropriation [ref. 3]. It
is worth looking at Fenno ' s work since this thesis also
uses percent changes as a measure. Fenno ' s operationaliza-
tion of incrementalism uses two measures of change in the
federal budget: (1) the relationships between agency re-
quests and Congressional appropriations, and (2) the change
in appropriations granted a given agency from one year to
the next [Ref. 3, p. 352]. Using these criteria, budget
action is considered incremental if Congress' cut of the

agency's request is incremental, regardless of the agency's
absolute change. Fenno studied the House Appropriations
Committee and used a 20 percent growth rate as the cut off
for incremental behavior. He found that almost three-
quarters of the 36 agencies studied were within the range
[Ref. 3, p. 354], One of the criticisms of Fenno ' s work
is that his selection of a 20 percent cut off point is far
too high, especially since he argues elsewhere that 5 per-
cent changes are significant [Ref. 8, p. 52]
.
The incrementalist theory is also supported by Wanat,
who has further strengthened the theory by showing that the
model succeeds as an explanatory, as well as descriptive,
tool. On the other hand, Wanat also indicates that many of
the statistical of Davis et al. are not as impressive as
originally thought [Ref. 4]
.
There is a growing body of research [Refs. 6, 7, 8 and
9] which challenges the incremental theory on numerous
points. This opposing body of thought concerning budget
behavior can be considered as "non-incremental" in nature.
Where incrementalism proposes that agencies generally
arrive at their budget requests by taking a relatively fixed
percentage increase of the prior year's appropriation and
that Congress arrives at the final appropriation by taking
a standard percentage cut of the agency request, the non-
incremental group proposes that budget action depends, to
an equal or greater extent, on factors other than the
10

agency's prior appropriations and current request and
that part of this action is political in nature.
When the budget is disaggregated from the agency level
to the program level a great deal of non-incremental activ-
ity becomes evident [Ref. 6, p. 956]. The choice of the
program as the unit of analysis reveals an allocation
process marked by trade offs and bureaucratic competition.
Some programs within the agency flourish while others
steadily decline and still others fluctuate from year to
year [Ref. 6] . Some non-incrementalist researchers
[Refs. 7 and 10] propose that how a program fares has more
to do with how capable the division directors are at com-
bating competing claims and mustering political and pres-
idential support for their programs than with the prior
year's appropriation.
Non- incremental approaches propose that budget action,
viewed as a whole, appears to be far more stable than close
examination of its component parts would indicate. The
incremental theory provides little explanation of the role
of the Office of Management and Budget (0MB) , while the
non-incremental approaches hypothesize that 0MB support and
agency assertiveness play major roles in determining an
agency's final appropriation, Assertiveness can be defined
as the propensity for agencies to attempt to expand their
programs and budgets [Ref. 11, p. 233] . This strategy is
often exhibited in the percent increase the agency requests
11
i
over last year's appropriation. When "aggressive" agencies
request large increases they are likely to receive large
cuts in their request but generally end up with larger
absolute gains than if they had made moderate requests
[Ref. 11, p. 234]. Some of the incremental theorists, par-
ticularly Sharkansky [Ref. 5] , also support this idea.
Previous appropriation levels are undoubtedly important,
however, factors such as the increase in the agency's re-
quest, increase in agency size, and presidential attention
and support are still more important. The idea that the
capabilities and support of key players are important is
common to most versions of the non-increm.ental approach
[Ref. 10]. Other factors, such as agency size, maturity,
and managerial experience, also have important roles in
explaining budget allocations [Ref. 7] . The proposal that
the agency should request as large an increase as it can
justify in order to maximize long term growth is also a
common idea.
Kanter's study of the defense budget from FY19 60 to
FY1970 [Ref. 9] classified budget action as being either
programmatic or budgetary (non-programjnatic) . The budgetary
viewpoint contends that participants in the budget process
are primarily concerned with how mcuh money is spent. The
programmatic viewpoint contends that primary emphasis is on
how the money is spent [ref. 9, p. 130] . The first measure
of Congressional activity Kanter uses to distinguish between
12

budgetary and programmatic behavior is the presence or
absence of changes in the President's budget request for four
major appropriation categories. He compares the relative
concentration of "no change" outcomes for each category to
an index of relative concentration, which would equal 1.00
for all categories if Congressional activity were equally
distributed [Ref. 9, p. 133]. Those categories which are
near or exceed the index are considered to exhibit budgetary
action, while those significantly below indicate program-
matic behavior.
The second measure used is the mean size of Congress-
ional changes for each category compared to the mean change
for the DOD total. Those categories which exceed the DOD
mean are considered to indicate programmatic behavior, while
those that are below the DOD mean indicate budgetary be-
havior [Ref. 9, p. 133].
Kanter's study shows, at least for the period in
question, that Congressional budget action is highly
programmatic in nature. He proposes, and presents evidence
to support, the theory that Congressional budget action
appears to be incremental at the DOD level due to the fact
that Congress makes relatively small and infrequent changes
in the Personnel and Operations & Maintenance (O&M) catego-
ries, which together account for approximately half of the
total DOD budget. Congressional budget action has been
concentrated in the Procurement and Research, Development,
13

Test & Evaluation (RDT&E) categories [Ref. 9, p. 142].
Kanter's study also shows that the President's budget action
also exhibited programmatic behavior. While Congressional
changes to the President's budget rarely exceeded 4 percent,
the administration's changes to the agencies' requests
ranged from 10 to 20 percent [Ref. 9, p. 131]. Congress
and the administration do occasionally employ across the
board cuts but the evidence supports the view that the maj-
ority of budget decisions are driven by programmatic
considerations
.
In a second study of the defense budget from FY19 55 to
FY1969, Kanter [Ref. 12] again presents evidence of program-
matic budget behavior. Throughout the Eisenhower and
Kennedy-Johnson administrations, budget decisions, which
appear non-programmatic at the DOD level, exhibit strong
programmatic indications at the appropriation category or
service level.
A slightly different perspective on incrementalism is
presented by Crecine [Ref. 13] and Bromiley and Crecine
[Ref. 14]. This research takes the previous year's budget
as a base and discusses adjustments which are largely non-
programmatic but includes several new variables and
formulations. The most important idea is that the total
available for expenditure is determined, at least partially,
independently of the sub-allocations. That is, if each
agency cr department budget is solely determ.ined by either
14

programmatic concerns or incrementalism, then the total for
a department or for government expenditures would be just a
sum. Bromiley and Crecine [Ref. 14] and Crecine [Ref. 13]
emphasize the importance of both kinds of information. The
budget problem is seen as one of adjusting sub-allocations
within a financial constraint. Within DOD , this kind of
adjustment means allocating a given total budget for DOD to
the numerous appropriations or programmatic categories.
When the problem is presented in this way, it becomes
obvious that all categories are not created equal. Some
agencies/programs are presidentially salient; the Pres-
ident's pet programs for instance. Some agencies are
largely uncontrollable as they are largely determined by
exogenous events. Finally, some programs are simply more
easily altered than others. It is easier to delay a
construction program or to extend a new weapons system in
R&D than it is to close m.ilitary bases or lay off permanent
civil servants. This line of research includes a number of
influences such as the previous allocation, the total funds
available, the political, economic, and rational needs for
the program, and the ease with which a given program can be
altered. It should be further noted, that this line of work
has observed that not only are all categories not equal, but
that there may be systematic differences in allocation depen-
ding on the relative "cutability" of categories and programs.
15

Crecine presents a list of decision rules utilized by
0MB in making adjustments, especially downward ones, to
budget items. The list includes adjustment procedures such
as reducing or deferring program increases , deferring con-
struction, and eliminating programs [Ref. 13, p. 27].
In addition, the presidential saliency of a program may have
a profound effect on 01V!E ' s willingness to make changes
[Ref. 14, p. 1054] .
A paper by Franklin C. Spinney [Ref. 15] does not
approach the question of defense budgeting from either of
the above viewpoints. Spinney's paper looks at which the
results of these budget decisions have been as opposed to
what motivated them. The problem.s that Spinney sees within
the defense establishment are caused more by how the budget
is spent than by how big it is.
Spinney's study found that the costs of procurement
programs are consistently underestimated as are operating
and maintenance costs. He also found that when funds are
readily available there is a strong tendency to begin new
programs instead of increasing the funding of existing ones.
This results in a marked increase in systems under develop-
ment. In addition, existing programs are very rarely
canceled, regardless of the availability of funds or the
current usefulness of the system. [Ref. 15, p. 2].
The lack of emphasis on personnel and O&M accounts has
been in spite of the fact that new weapons systems are
16

becoming increasingly expensive to man and operate. The
result of this behavior is that the services are faced with
smaller numbers of highly complex weapons systems with even
more complex systems under development. As a consequence,
historical budget behavior has resulted in shrinking forces,
persistent low peacetime readiness, and declining rates of
modernization [Ref. 15, p. 2].
B. THE STUDY
The intent of this thesis is to determine the effect
changing availability of funds at the DOD level has on the
categories which make up the DOD total and to determine
whether or not identifiable patterns exist.
This study shall examine budget data for the Department
of Defense from fiscal year 1955 through fiscal year 1984.
The subject of the examination will be the DOD total and
four major appropriations categories. Gross budget data
shall be examined first in order to obtain a feel for the
overall growth of the budget and its constituent parts.
In order to facilitate further examination, the data
will be broken down into three groups based on the growth
rate of the DOD total. Each of these groups will, in turn,
be examined on the basis of budget shares, growth rates, and
the percentage of the annual DOD increm.ent that went to each
of the four categories.
17

III. DATA BASE AND RESULTS
A, DATA BASE AND SOURCES
The source of the budget data used in this study was The
Budget of the United States Government [Ref, 16] for the
fiscal years 1955 through 1984, The transitional quarter
(TQ) from July 1, 1976 to September 30, 1976 has been
excluded. The TQ appropriations and outlays were based on
continuing resolutions and as such were intentionally incre-
mental in nature. In addition, these figures are relatively
small by themselves but aggregating them with the figures
for either FY76 or FY77 would distort the data for that
year. The appropriate GNP deflators for FY83 and FY83 were
obtained from the Budget of the United States Government for
FY84. GNP deflators for other years were obtained from^ the
Economic Report of the President for 1983 [Ref . 17]
.
The data consists of aggregate figures for four DOD
m.ajor appropriations categories. Estimated outlay figures




Operation and Maintenance (O&M)
Procurement (PROG)
Research, Development, Test & Evaluation (RDT&E)
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The f4P category consists of all MP categories for the
Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force, including reserves
and National Guard where applicable. No amounts for retired
pay have been included.
The O&M category contains all O&M line items for the
four services and their reserves and National Guard. No
amounts for Defense agencies, Court of Military Appeals, or
other general boards have been included. Defense agencies
are non-military agencies and activities of DOD such as the
Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Defense Logistics
agency, and other intelligence and coram.unications , training,
medical, and adm.inistrative activities.
The PROC category consists of all procurement line items
for the four services, their reserves and the National
Guard. Defense agencies procurement has been excluded.
The RDT&E category consists of all research items for
the Army, Navy, and Air Force (there is no separate category
for the Marine Corps) . Defense agency RDT&E has been
excluded.
Categories for Military Construction, Family Housing,
and the Special Foreign Currency Program have been excluded
from the study as have all Stock, Industrial, Management,
and Trust Funds.
On the average, the four categories studied account for
88% of the DOD total annual budgeted outlays. While the




every effort has been made to ensure that the items included
in the various categories have remained as consistent as
possible. Current outlay figures were translated into con-
stant 1972 dollars using the GNP deflator. Current dollar
budget data appear in Appendix A and constant dollar budget
data appear in Appendix B. All dollar figures are in millions
of dollars unless otherwise noted.
B. RESULTS
In the period from FY 1955 to FY 1984, the defense budget
in current dollars increased from $41,850 million to $238,600
million, an average annual increase of $6,558 million. In
constant 1972 dollars, the budget went from $68,787 million
to $104,010 million, an average annual increase of $1,174
million. During the same period N-P experienced average annual
increases of $1,227 million ($98 million in '72 dollars),
O&M experienced annual increases of $1,803 million ($358
million in '72 dollars), PROC exhibited average annual growth
of $1,744 million ($148 million in '72 dollars), and RDT&E
experienced increases of $746 million ($299 m.illion in '72
dollars)
.
These figures show, in a very rough way, the growth of
the defense budget but they tell little of how the compo-
nents of the budget have changed over the years.
1. Budget Shares
Table 1 shows how the budget shares of the DOD
budget have varied during the period under study. Table 1
20

shows that, while the total defense budget increased during
the period, the distribution of funds within the budget
changed considerably. MP and PROC made up 19 percent less
of the budget in FY84 than they had in FY55, while O&M
decreased by 2 percent and RDT&E increased by 139 percent.
These changes were not simple linear changes, but rather the
four categories experienced fluctuating fortunes.
In order to facilitate further examination of budget
behavior, the 29 years from FY56 to FY84 have been broken
down into three groups. The groups consist of the top and
middle ten and the bottom nine years determined on the basis
of the percent increase over the previous year for the DOD
total. In order to eliminate the effect of annual inflation
the budget figures have been transformed into constant 19 72
dollars. The top group consists of those ten years in which
defense funds were "abundant" (i.e., the years which experi-
enced the greatest percent increases over the previous years)
.
The bottom group consists of the nine years in which defense
funds could be considered as "tight".
The remaining group consists of the ten years in which
the availability of funds could be considered as "normal".
Table 2 presents data for the top group presented by
the percentage of the DOD total accounted for by the indivi-
dual categories.
This table is similar to Table 1, but in order to elim-




CATEGORIES AS PERCENT OF DOD TOTAL
(PERCENTAGE OF DOD TOTAL)
DOD
FY TOTAL MP O&M PROC RDT&E
56 34,000 30.35 26.77 35.97 3.79
57 35,547 30.74 26.22 32.84 4.02
58 38,000 31.85 28.49 34.93 4.44
59 39,779 28.74 26.60 34.89 4.51
60 40,945 27.40 25.19 34.04 6.94
61 42,745 26.56 24.37 32.40 7.31
62 44,600 25.70 23.85 32.34 8.83
63 48,300 25.40 23.05 32.67 11.80
64 51,000 23.90 22.02 32.00 12.86
65 51,200 25.62 22.48 28.78 11.84
66 47,900 27.75 24.40 27.52 12.34
67 57,100 28.70 24.83 27.87 10.39
68 72,300 27.37 24.93 29.85 9.28
69 76,806 26.70 27.52 30.46 9.48
70 78,471 27.33 26.40 29.79 9.30
71 71,190 29.37 25.93 26.31 9.69
72 74,975 26. 82 25.33 23.84 9.32
73 75,903 29.38 25.23 21.12 9.75
74 78,200 28.77 25.78 21.01 9.68
75 84,600 28.87 27,22 19.25 9.89
76 89,800 27.84 28.55 18.28 10.00
77 99,561 25.36 27.93 20.25 9.77
78 102,523 23.74 27.78 21.56 9.67
79 115,200 23.32 28.97 20.84 9.48
80 122,700 23.18 28.61 20.58 9.62
81 142,700 22.22 29.62 21.17 9.56
82 184,399 20.76 29.62 21.57 9.21
83 215,900 20.62 27.73 25.19 9.34
84 238,600 19.98 27.12 28.29 9.96
Mean 188,886 26.36 26.29 27.09 9.04
22

following tables, is presented in constant 1972 dollars
instead of current year dollars. When funds are abundant
(Table 2) PROC accounts for the greatest portion of the
budget (28.08 percent), followed closely by O&M, while RDT&E
accounts for the lowest percentage.
TABLE 2




FY DOD MP O&M PROC RDT&E
82 $ 88,983 20.76 29.62 ^21.57 9.21
68 87,594 27.37 24.93 '^ 29.85 9.28
67 72,287 28.70 24.83 ^ 27.87 10.39
83 97,472 20.62 27.73 25.19 9.34
84 104,010 19.98 27.12 28.29 9.96
63 67,392 25.40 23.05 32.67 11.80
81 72,989 22.22 29.62 ' 21.17 9.56
58 57,541 31.85 28.49 / 34.93 4.44
77 71,090 25.36 27.93 U 20.25 9.77
64 70,084 23.90 22.02 - 32.00 12.86
Mean 78,944 • 24.62 26.53 27.38 9.66
Med. 72,638 24.63 27.43 28.08 9.67
Table 3 presents the data for the middle group. PROC
again accounts for the greatest percentage of the defense
budget, followed by MP, O&M, and RDT&E. MP and PROC changed
by more than 10 percent, while O&M and RDT&E changed by less
than 7 percent.
When funds are "tight" (Table 4) there is additional
change. PROC had the largest decrease and now contributes
23

less of the defense budget than O&M or r^P , while RDT&E was


















DOD MP O&M PROC RDT&E
61 $61,654 26.56 24.37 32.40 7.31
62 63,249 25.70 23.85 32.34 8.83
78 72,811 23.74 27.78 21.56 9.67
59 59,845 28.74 26.60 34.89 4.51
60 59,600 27.40 25.19 34.04 6.94
72 74,975 26.82 25.33 23.84 9.32
57 54,747 30.74 26.22 32.84 4.02
69 88,496 26.70 27.52 30.46 9.48
76 67,856 27.84 28.55 18.28 10.00
75 67,253 28.87 27.22 19.25 9.89
Mean 67,549 27.31 26.26 28.01 8.00
Med. 65,251 27.11 26.41
TABLE 4
31.40 9.05














































FY DOD MP O&M PROC RDT&E
Mean 69,341 27.23 26.06 25.77 9.52
Med. 68,854 27.75 25.92 26.31 9.68
Exainining these tables together shows fluctuations
in the behavior of the four categories. In moving from
affluent to poor groupings the MP average rises initially by
more than 10 percent then falls slightly.
O&M remains relatively constant throughout the
spectrum and PROC rises by approximately 2 percent then falls
by almost 8 percent. RDTSeE falls by approximately 17 percent
then rises back near its initial level.
2 . Growth Rates
Table 5 presents the percent increase from the prev-
ious year's budget in constant '72 dollars for the four
categories and the DOD total for the period FY56 to FY84.
During this period the DOD ' s annual increase averaged 1.81
percent of the previous year's budgeted outlays. MP's annual
rate of change averaged .74, while O&M's average rate of
change was 2.02 percent, PROC ' s average rate of change was
1.62 percent, and RDT&E 's average rate of change was 8.29
percent. RDT&E, which is the smallest of the four categories,
had the highest rate of change by a considerable margin.
Examination of Table 5 shows that the rates of change of the
four budget categories were not steady, consistent increments
but that there were rises and falls in each of the categories.
The DOD total ranged from a 21.28 decrement to a 21.91 incre-




PERCENT CHANGE FROM PREVIOUS FISCAL YEAR
(In Constant '72 Dollars)
FY DOD MP O&M PROC RDT&E
56 -21.28 -7.96 -17.01 -22.03 54.80
57 1.10 2.41 -.97 -7.71 2.43
58 5.10 1.86 6.80 29.86 8.63
59 2.27 -1.38 2.07 -12.06 10.99
60 1.28 -3.43 -4.07 -1.18 55.78
61 3.45 .26 .07 -1.54 8.90
62 2.59 -.84 .28 2.26 23.81
63 6.55 5.43 3.09 7.78 42.60
64 3.99 -2.14 -.64 1.87 13.35
65 -1.76 5.29 .31 -11.64 -9.60
66 -9.37 -1.83 -1.65 -13.35 -5.52
67 15.84-^ 19.81 17.89 17.35 -2.42
68 21.18x^ 15.57 21.65 29.78 8.20
69 1.03 -1.45 11.54 3.03 3.18
70 -3.04 -.75 -7.00 -5.18 -4.89
71 -13.59 -7.12 -15.14 -23.63 -9.96
72 1.11 -7.69 -1.18 -8.37 -2.76
73 -4.27 4.89 -4.65 -15.20 .16
74 -5.33 -7.28 -3.26 -5.83 -5.94
75 -1.03 -.67 4.50 -9.28 1.10
76 .89 -2.72 5.81 -4.21 2.49
77 4.77 -4.56 2.49 16.05 1.87
78 2.42 -4.11 1.87 9.06 1.38
79 -3.13 -4.91 .98 -6.44 -5.08
80 -2.56 -3.14 -3.78 -3.79 -1.14
81 6.26 1.84 10.01 9.31 5.57
82 21.91-^ 13.91 21.93 24.23 17.44
83 9.54 8.32 2.55 27.94 11.13
84 6.71 3.39 4.36 19.84 13.78
Mean 1.81 .74 2.02 1.62 8.29
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Table 6 uses the saine breakdown by years as before
but presents the data by percent change from the previous
year. This table gives an indication of the distribution of
defense funds when funds are "abundant". When funds are
readily available, PROC and RDT&E experience the highest
average annual increases. The increases for both these
categories exceed the DOD increase, while the MP average is
32 percent below and the O&M average is 12 percent below.
Table 7 presents the data for the middle group. The
DOD average has decreased by 89 percent and two categories,
lAP and PROC, now experience average annual decreases.
TABLE 6
TOP 10 YEARS BY PERCENT CHANGE IN DOD OUTLAYS
(Constant '72 Dollars)
(Percent Change From Previous Year)
FY DOD MP O&M PROC RDT&E
82 21.91 13.91 21.93 24.23 17.44
68 21.18 15.57 21.65 29.78 8.20
67 15.84 19.81 17.89 17.35 -2.42
83 9.54 8.82 2.55 27.92 11.13
84 6.71 3.39 4.36 19.84 13.78
63 6.55 5.43 3.09 7.78 42.60
81 6.26 1.84 10.01 9.31 5.57
58 5.10 1.86 6.80 29.86 8.63
77 4.77 -4.56 2.49 16.05 1.87
64 3.99 -2.14 -.64 1. 37 13.35
Mean 10.19 6.39 9.01 18.40 12.02




MIDDLE 10 YEARS BY PERCENT CHANGE IN DOD TOTAL
(Constant '72 Dollars)
(Percent Change From Previous Year)
FY DOD MP O&M PROC RDT&E
61 3.45 .26 .07 -1.54 8.90
62 2.59 -.84 .28 2.26 23.81
78 2.42 -4.11 1.87 9.06 1.38
59 2.27 -1.38 2.07 -12.06 10.99
60 1.28 -3.43 -4.07 -1.18 55.78
72 1.11 -7.69 -1.18 -8.37 -2.76
57 1.10 2.41 -.97 -7.71 2.43
69 1.03 -1.45 11.54 3.08 3.18
76 .89 -2.72 5.81 -4.21 2.49
75 -1.03 -.67 4.50 -9.28 1.10
Mean 1.51 -1.96 1.99 -3.00 10.73
Median 1.20 -1.42 1.08 -2.88 2.87
PROC suffered the greatest shift and now experiences
the largest average decreases. O&M is still increasing but
at a much slower rate than in the previous group. RDT&E
has also declined but less than the other categories and now
experiences the highest average increase, still a healthy 10
percent real growth.
Table 8 presents the data for the bottom, nine years.
When defense funds are "tight" all the categories except
RDT&E experience average decreases. RDT&E does the best
under these conditions having an average gain, while MP has
smaller decreases than either O&M or PROC. PROC again does




BOTTOM 9 YEARS BY PERCENT CHANGE IN DOD TOTAL
(Constant '72 Dollars)
(Percent Change From Previous Year)
FY DOD MP O&M PROC RDT&E
65 -1.76 5.29 .31 -11.64 -9.60
80 -2.56 -3.14 -3.78 -3.79 -1.14
70 -3.04 -.75 -7.00 -5.18 -4.89
79 -3.18 -4.91 .98 -6.44 -5.08
73 -4.27 4.89 -4.65 -15.20 .16
74 -5.33 -7.28 -3.26 -5.83 -5.94
66 -9.37 -1.83 -1.65 -13.35 -5.52
71 -13.59 -7.12 -15.14 -23.68 -9.96
56 -21.28 -7.96 -17.07 -22.03 54.80
Mean -6.93 -2.53 -5.70 -11.90 1.43
Median -4.27 -3.14 -3.78 -11.64 -5.08
Through these three tables the distribution of DOD
budgeted outlays becomes a little more clear. As defense
funds become more and more scarce the distribution of those
funds changes. The annual changes for the four categories
all decrease but not to the same extent. PROC goes from
having the highest average increases when funds are "abundant"
to having the greatest average decreases when funds are
"tight". MP behaves in exactly the opposite manner, gaining
little in good times but losing little in tight tim.es. RDT&E
has average gains throughout the spectrum. O&M shows gains
in the top and middle groups but loses at the low end, while
the other categories suffer losses at the middle and low end.
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3 . Percentage of POD Increment
Table 9 presents the percentage of the annual DOD
increment that went to each of the four categories. When
examining this table it must be renem±)ered that the sign of
each change is relative to the sign of the DOD increment for
that year. For example, in FY72 the DOD total had increased
by $826 million, while IVL? made up -202.78 percent of that
change, or a $1,675 million decrease. In FY73 the DOD total
decreased by $3,199 million, while l^P made up -30.70 percent
of that decrease, or a $982 million increase.
Due to the several large outlying points in the data,
calculated means give a distorted view of the central tendency
of these categories. In this case the m.edians reflect a
truer picture of the budgetary behavior during the period.
Table 9 shows that PROC constituted the greatest
proportion of the defense budget changes, followed by O&M,
RDTStE, and f'lP . This would indicate that PROC, whose median
change is 38 percent of the DOD change, is the item most
dependent on the fortunes of the defense budget as a whole.
The final series of tables uses the previous break-
down but now the data is presented by the percentage of the
annual DOD increment that is accounted for by each of the
categories. Medians are presented along with the means for
this data, as they were for Table 9, Discussion of these




CATEGORY AS A PERCENT OF ANNUAL DOD CHANGE
(Constant '72 Dollars)




































































When funds are "abundant" (Table 10) PROC accounts
for the greatest portion (38.78 percent) of DOD changes.
Since these changes are positive in nature, PROC receives
substantial gains. The other categories also receive gains
but the next highest category, O&M, realizes only about half
the annual gains that PROC does.
TABLE 10




FY CHANGE MP O&xM PROC RDT&E
82 $15,994 14.11 29.64 29.64 7.60
68 15,307 21.10 25.39 39.20 4.20
67 9,885 34.69 27.56 30.14 -1.38
83 8,489 19.19 7.93 6 3.18 10.72
84 6,538 10.42 18.03 74.53 19.18
63 4,143 21.29 11.25 38.35 57.35
81 4,303 6.79 45.71 30.61 8.55
58 2,794 11.24 34.93 192.16 6.80
77 3,234 -26.65 14.90 61.56 3.93
64 2,692 -13.60 -3.71 15.30 39.45
Mean 5,961 9.86 21.16 56.84 15.60
Median 5,421 12.68 21.71 38.78 8.08
The middle group shows considerable difference. The
DOD changes are still increases but now the median percentages
of that change are negative for both MP and PROC. These two
categories are now experiencing decreases even though the
defense total is still increasing. In addition, the O&M
percentage is low (1.59 percent) and the RDT&E percentage
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has more than doubled. The low percentages and the fact
that half of them are negative indicates that most of the DOD
increment during these middle years is accounted for by those
categories not subject to this study.
In the final group (Table 12) , there is even more
variation. The annual DOD change is now a decrement and all
four categories are declining. PROC now accounts for the
largest proportion of the total losses, while O&K accounts
for less than half of PROC's proportion. RDT&E and MP suffer
less than either of the other two categories.
TABLE 11




FY CHANGE MP O&M
61 $2,054 ^ 2.09 .54
62 1,595-" -8.65 2.63
78 1,721-^ -43.06 21.62
59 1,304^ -17,94 24.39
60 755 -76.69 -84.37
72 826' -202.78 -27.36
57 598 66.22 -23.41
69 902- -38.47 279.40
76 601 -87.85 176.87
75 , -698 18.91 -112.89
Mean 966 -38.82 24.94































Viewing these last three data sets together provides
an interesting picture of the categories' behavior.
MP fluctuated from next to the least gains in high
dollar conditions to having the greatest losses in the middle
years, then to having the second lowest losses as a percen-
tage of the DOD change in the leanest years . PROC declined
from the highest gains to the second greatest losses then
declined even further to have the greatest losses. O&M
initially received the second highest gains and ended with
the second greatest losses, while RDT&E changed from the





























C. SUMMARY OF RESULTS
The data presented in the previous section is summarized
in Tables 13 and 14, which present the relative performance
of the categories under varying availabilities of funds.
TABLE 13
RELATIVE RANKINGS OF CATEGORIES
(Percent Change From Previous Fiscal Year)
AVAILABILITY
OF FUNDS MP O&M PROC RDT&E
"ABUNDANT" 4 3 12
"NORMAL" 3 2 4 1
"TIGHT" 2 3 4 1
Table 13 shows how relative performance changed based on
annual growth rates. RDT&E does comparatively well when
funds are "abundant" and even better when they are "tight".
O&M shows little change under the differing conditions. ?1P
does comparatively better as funds become less available and
PROC shifts from doing the best when funds are available to
doing the worst when they are "tight".
TABLE 14
RELATIVE RANKING OF CATEGORIES
(Percentage of DOD Annual Change)
AVAILABILITY
OF FUNDS MP O&M PROC RDT&E
"ABUNDANT" 3 2 1 4
"NORMAL" 4 2 3 1
"TIGHT" 2 3 4 1
Table 14 presents relative performance rankings based on
the percentage of the annual DOD increment that goes to each.
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category. RTD&E again does better as funds get tighter and
O&M still shows little change. MP still does better overall
as funds become less available and PROC again shifts from
doing the best to doing the worst, although more gradually.
Patterns emerge as the data is examined in detail. MP
experiences shifts as conditions change but not over a wide
range. MP neither realizes large gains when times are good,
nor suffers much when funds are tight. O&M exhibits somewhat
more variation and does comparatively better than MP when
funds are available but also suffers more when they are tight.
RDT&E, though the smallest of the four categories, always
shows average increases. This category does not have as high
a growth rate as PROC when funds are "abundant" but does the
best under any other condition. While not the recipient of
large increases in absolute terms (none above $1,300 million)
,
RDT&E is relatively immune to cuts. The category experienced
growth rates in excess of 50 percent twice, both times during
years in the lower two groups , and suffered reductions in
fewer years than any other category. When looking at Table
14, note that RDT&E is much smaller in absolute terms than
the other categories. Thus, though it obtained the smallest
portion of the DOD increment when funds were abundant, this
translated into next to the most rapid growth rate compared
to its program size.
PROC is the category showing the widest variation in
relative success. The category does the best when funds are
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"abundant" and experience gains far above any other category.
When funds become less available, however, PROC suffers the
greatest cuts.
These performance patterns present evidence to support
the notion of strong interdependence between certain of the
categories and also the concept that certain categories are
more adjustable than others. MP and O&M appear to be less
variable than the other two categories and they exhibit
smaller year to year fluctuations.
The data further shows clearly just how deceptive looking
at raw totals can be. In years in which the total DOD budget
changed little there may be considerable redistributions of
the funds among the categories. For exam.ple, in FY76 the
DCD total grew at the rate of only .89 percent, but MP exper-
ienced a 2.72 percent decrease, O&M experienced 5.81 percent
growth, PROC suffered a 4.21 percent decrease, and RDT&E
experienced 2.49 percent growth. In terms of budget shares
MP decreased by 1.03 percentage points, O&M increased by 1.33
percentage points, PROC decreased by .97 percentage points,
and RDT&E decreased by .23 percentage points. A considerable




A* DISTRIBUTION OF THE DOD BUDGET
The examination of the budget data shows that there are
patterns of distribution within the total. !'7hen funds are
readily available PROC and RDT&E show the highest growth
rates (18.4 and 12.02 percent respectively), while O&M and
MP exhibit slower growth. In the middle years RDT&E contin-
ues to grow, while PROC drops fourth place relative to the
other categories. O&M and MP both rise. IJhen funds are
tight PROC remains in fourth place, while O&M drops to third
place and !4P rises to second. RDT&E is now the only category
to experience average increases.
These patterns hold true regardless of whether the data
is based on budget shares, growth rates, or percentage of
DOD increm.ent. PROC is always closely linked to the avail-
ability of funds. RDT&E always shows average increases,
while O&ri and MP do less well but are still fairly stable.
In addition to the patterns noted above, examination of
Table 5 indicates something of a trade-off between PROC and
RDT&E. In 16 of the 29 years studied PROC suffered
decreases. In 50 percent of those years RDT&E experienced
increases averaging 17.10 percent, which is more than double
the overall average growth rate of 8.29 percent. In compar-
ison, in the 13 years in which PROC increased, RDT&E
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decreased only once (7.7 percent) at a rate of only 2.42
percent. This is indicative of a strong relationship
between these two categories. In no other combination of
categories are such trade-offs so noticable.
These figures provide added support to Spinney's
arguments that funds are poured into PROC and RDT&E at the
expense of O&M. and r-lP when times are good and that, when
times are bad, program.s are merely extended in RDT&E instead
of being canceled.
B. POLICY PREFERENCES VS. "CUTABILITY"
Previous research by Kanter [Ref. 5] has focused on
Congressional behavior and investigated whether Congress-
ional budgeting choices have been budgetary (i.e., concerned
primarily with how much is spent) or programmatic (i.e.,
reflecting real program choices) . This study of the
President's budgets found evidence of both programmatic and
budgetary effects. A review of Ranter's findings will
provide a convenient guideline for the review of this study's
findings
.
Kanter 's study of the defense budget during the '60's
[Ref. 9] proposes that Congressional action on the Military
Personnel and Operation and Maintenance categories is budget-
ary in nature and that action on the Procurement and Research,
Development, Test, & Evaluation categories is programm.atic.
To som.e degree this is supported by the figures in this
study, which indicate that Procurem.ent and Research,
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Development, Test & Evaluation receive the most attention at
the President/OflB level, but by them.selves , tell little about
whether such attention is budgetary or programmatic. Exam-
ination of the categories in light of their "cutability" may
provide some insight as to the nature of this attention. If
budget behavior is primarily budgetary in nature then "cut-
able" categories should receive the largest increases when
funds are abundant and should suffer the largest losses when
they are tight. Categories which are relatively imjnune to
cuts should rem.ain comparatively stable.
Military Personnel is a category which is not easily cut.
Military personnel cannot just be laid off during slack times.
Conversely, personnel increases require som^e lead tim.e and
must take into account availability of potential volunteers,
pay rates and other external factors. The budget data shows
that Military Personnel has remiained fairly stable relative
to the other categories, as would be expected under conditions
of budgetary behavior.
Operation and Maintenance is somewhat more "cutable"
than Military Personnel. Steaming and flying hours of ships
and aircraft can be increased or decreased within a certain
range and civilian hirings can be frozen if necessary, but
the greatest proportion of Operation and Maintenance is not
easily changed from year to year. This too is borne out by
the data, which shows Operation and Maintenance to be less
stable than Military Personnel but far m.ore so than Procuremeni
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Procurement is relatively easy to change: production
schedules can be drawn out or speeded up: new systems can
be delayed for additional RDT&S; and new systems started up
or, very rarely, old ones canceled. The data shows PROC
to be the most variable category relative to the others.
It is possible that Administration budget action is
purely incremental in nature. When funds become less avail-
able those categories easily cut suffer the most, while those
categories which are relatively impervious to cuts suffer
less. The exception to this pattern is Research, Development,
Test & Evaluation.
Research, Development, Test & Evaluation is relatively
susceptible to potential cuts. New project starts can be
delayed, current projects shelved, old or obsolete programis
canceled and basic research reduced in order to reduce
funding. On the other hand, funding can also be increased
quickly when funds are readily available. The data shows
that, when funds are abundant, RDT&E has the second highest
growth rate and the lowest percentage of the annual DOD
increment. This could be expected performance for easily
changed categories. However, contrary to what would be
expected using Ranter's budgetary model, when funds become
less aval lab, e RDT&E shows the highest growth rate and the
highest percentage of the DOD increment. At the same time,
the other easily changed category, PROC, drops from, first to
fourth place and from first to third place respectively.
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When funds become tight, RDT&E continues to do the best
relative to the other categories, while PROC does the worst.
If the Administration's budget behavior was purely-
budgetary, Research, Test, Development & Evaluation would be
expected to show performance similar to Procurement. It
obviously does not. Research, Test, Development & Evaluation's
continued success in the face of shrinking funds and the
trade-offs between RDT&E and Procurem.ent are indicative of
strong programinatic behavior at the Administration level, at
least for these two categories. The data presented here
indicates that Presidential/OMB budget actions are inspired
largely by policy preferences and that many decisions appear
to be based on judgemental relationships between weapons
systems and perceived national security needs.
This study has shown that there are distribution patterns
of funds within the DOD total. The patterns seen at this
level of aggregation would seem to weaken the arguments in
support of the linear increm.entalist budgeting models. In
this case the whole is less informative than the parts. The
study also supports the concept that all programs are not
equal and that categories do differ in their degree of
"cutability".
This descriptive analysis of the DOD budget for the last
30 years does not provide conclusive evidence for Spinney's
proposition that historical budget behavior has resulted in
shrinking forces, low peacetime readiness, and declining
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rates of modernization but there does appear to be an emphasis
on weapons systems over manpower and support costs. The
results indicate that the concentration on the PROC and
RDT&E categories is an intentional programmatic policy
decision. In spite of Spinney's proposals, it remains to be
seen whether this decision has had any long term effect on
military readiness or not.
C. AREAS FOR FURTHER STUDY
The Federal Budget, particularly the defense budget, is
a virtually limitless field for further research. There are
several possibilities for continuing the research presented
here. The data presented for the four categories could be
further broken down by service. This would allov; an analy-
sis to be made of the relative success of each service in
competing for scarce DOD resources. Combined with the
current data a reasonably distinct picture of the detailed
distribution of DOD funds over the last 30 years should
emerge.
Another subject for study could be an attempt to deter-
mine what the historical impetus has been for programmatic
budgeting decisions. This could take the form of an attempt
to answer the question: How have socio-political events such
as foreign and domestic wars, the civil rights movem.ent, or
economic recessions affected defense budgeting decisions?
A final topic for further study would be an attem.pt to
determine whether or not new weapons systems are truly
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becoming too complex for today's military personnel. Are
the problems Spinney sees with the modern military real and







FY DOD MP O&M PROC RDT&E
1955 41 ,850 10 ,863 10,635 15 ,200 845
1956 34 ,000 10 ,319 9,103 12 ,231 1,350
1957 35 r547 10 ,928 9,322 11 ,673 1,430
1958 38 ,000 11 ,322 10,126 12 ,418 1,580
1959 39 ,779 11 ,431 10,580 13 ,878 1,795
1960 40 ,945 11 ,219 10,315 13 ,937 2,842
1961 42 ,745 11 ,352 10,417 13 ,849 3,123
1962 44 ,660 11 ,464 10,638 14 ,423 3,938
1963 48 ,300 12 ,268 11,132 15 ,778 5,700
1964 51 ,000 12 ,190 11,230 16 ,320 6,560
1965 51 ,200 13 ,225 11,511 14 ,735 6,060
1966 47 ,900 13 ,290 11,687 13 ,180 5,910
1967 57 ,150 16 ,400 14,190 15 ,930 5,940
1968 72.,300 19 ,787 18,022 21 ,584 6,710
1969 76 ,806 20 ,505 21,137 23 ,395 7,280
1970 78 r471 21 ,444 20,713 23 ,375 7,296
1971 71 190 20 ,911 18,453 18 ,729 6,897
1972 74 ,975 20 ,105 18,994 17 ,875 6,985
1973 75,,903 22 ,300 19,152 16,,029 7,399
1974 78 ,200 22 ,500 20,162 16 ,427 7,573
1975 84, 600 24,,428 23,030 16 ,289 8,369
1976 89, 800 25 ,001 25,636 16, 416 9,024
1977 99, 561 25, 250 27,805 20, 161 9,728
1978 109, 523 26, 005 30,423 23,,616 10,592
1979 115, 200 26,,866 33,374 24, 007 10,923
1980 122, 700 28, 447 35,105 25, 248 11,804
1981 142, 700 31 ,705 42,265 30, 206 13,638
19 82 184, 399 38, 280 54,621 39, 775 16,976
1983 215, 900 44,,524 59,873 54, 393 20,164









DEFLATOR DOD MP O&M PROG RDT&E
1955 60.84 68,787 17,855 17,481 24 ,984 1,389
1956 62.79 54,149 16,434 14,498 19 ,479 2,150
1957 64.93 54,747 16,830 14,358 17 ,978 2,202
1958 66.04 57,541 17,144 15,333 23 ,346 2,392
1959 67.60 58,845 16,910 15,651 20 ,530 2,655
1960 68.70 59,600 16,331 15,014 20 ,287 4,137
1961 69.33 61,654 16,374 15,025 19 ,975 4,505
1962 70.61 63,249 16,236 15,066 20 ,426 5,577
1963 71.67 67,392 17,117 15,532 22 ,015 7,953
1964 72.77 70,034 16,751 15,432 22 ,437 9,015
1965 74.36 68,854 17,637 15,480 19 ,816 8,150
1966 76.76 62,402 17,314 15,225 17 ,170 7,699
1967 79.06 72,287 20,743 17,948 20 ,149 7,513
1968 82.54 87,594 23,973 21,834 26 ,150 8,129
1969 86.79 88,496 23,626 24,354 26 ,956 8,388
1970 91.45 85,808 23,449 22,650 25 ,560 7,978
1971 96.01 74,149 21,780 19,220 19 ,507 7,183
1972 100.00 74,975 20,105 18,944 17 ,875 6,985
1973 105.75 71,776 21,870 18,111 15 ,157 6,996
1974 115.08 67,953 19,552 17,520 14 ,274 6,581
1975 125.79 67,255 19,420 18,308 12 ,949 6,653
1976 132.34 67,856 18,891 19,371 12 ,404 6,819
1977 140.05 71,090 18,030 19,854 14; 396 6,946
*GNP deflators were obtained from The Economic Report of
the President [Ref. 16] with the exception of FY83 and FY84,







FY DEFLATOR DOD MP O&M PROC RDT&E
1978 150.42 72,811 17,288 20,225 15,700 7,042
1979 163.42 70,493 16,440 20,422 14,690 6,684
1980 178.64 68,686 15,924 19,651 14,133 6,608
1981 195.51 72,989 16,217 21,618 15,450 6,976
1982 207.23 88,983 18,472 26,358 19,194 8,192
1983 221.50 97,472 20,101 27,031 24,557 9,103
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